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2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We desire to supplement and to differ in some respects with the statement of facts contained in Appellants' brief. Our difference lays largely with respect to
the mental condition of Emma G. Buttars. (References
will be to the Clerk's numbering at the bottom of each
page in blue numerals. )
( R. 56-57) Counsel for all parties stipulated that
aside from the record in the former proceedings no further proof would be offered as to the mental condition
of Mrs. Buttars. "Both counsel for both sides recognize
the fact that undue influence and fraud may indirectly
involve mental competency, but in this respect both
parties desire to refrain from direct testimony as to mental
condition. IVIr. Daines: We so stipulate. Mr. Heinrich:
We so stipulate." Thereupon the entire transcdpt in Case
No. 5167 (the Will case) was offered and received. Upon
the state of the record at that point in the case of In Re
Buttars' Estate (Utah, Sept. 26, 1933), 261 P. 2d 171
becomes factual because this Court said:
"The evdence related above is proof that testatrix
was essentric in her actions but is utterly insufficient
to sustain the contestants' burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that she lacked testamentary capacity at the time she executed the Will"
In relation to all of the conveyances both real and
personal property the following facts are also recited:
"Testatrix had always been a frugal woman who believed that one should earn what he received.
Shortly after she executed her Will she made con-
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veyances of a considerable part of her real property
to Wallace and two of her younger daughters who
lived near her. She also assigned some valuable
bank stock and bought U. S. Savings Bonds for these
daughters giving as her reason for doing so that they
had received worthless stock from their father's estate, of which she one of the administrators, as part
of their share in his estate. This was not worthless
at the time of the distribution but became so within
a few years thereafter."
All of the property involved in this Appeal is referred
to in the quotation, and the references to individuals are
to Archulius Archibald, Hattie Hodge and Wallace Buttars. In view of the state of the record, it becomes unnecessary to again incorporate the same facts in this statement as Appellant has done. The Will was executed on
March 22, 1945, so that at that time she has been judicially declared to be mentally competent, and since the
stipulation above referred to takes care of the question of
mentality, the only remaining question is one of undue
influence. The lower Court made a finding that there
was a "close and intimate" relationship between Wallace,
Archulius and their Mother.
It was Mrs. Buttars, herself, who made arrangements
about her bank account ( R.R. 93-94), and not because of
any undue influence. ( R.H. 94) She made some of her
transactions even without the knowledge of her son and
daughter. who are charged with using undue influence.
The facts concerning some of her bonds and 22 shares of
bank stock were not known until after the death of Mrs.
Buttars ( H.R. 95). There was no suggestion to Mrs. Buttars by any one involved in this appeal as to what con-
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veyances should be made by her (R.R. 103-104), and the
conveyances were all made in pursuance to a plan that
Mrs. Buttars had in mind since shortly after her husband's
estate had been probated (R.R. 105-106). The testimony
of ~frs. Mabell Griffiths (beginning R.R. 108) makes no
mention of fraud, undue influence or mental condition.
Mrs. Jardine's testimony as to undue influence contains only the following: ( R.R. 112). Supposedly the
repetition of a statement made by Mrs. Buttars. "If they
(the Archibalds) didn't have all the land they wanted
why didn't they go to his own dad and get it, instead of
hounding her for her's." Mrs. Buttars had reserved a life
estate in real property to insure herself of a livelihood
( R.R. 113). One of these deeds had been of record since
the g}3th day of March, 1945, (only six days after Mrs.
Buttars had executed her Will) and Mrs. Jardine (and undoubtedly other appellants) had known of the deeds and
conveyances since 1950, and they waited until. after their
Mother had died before bringing any action ( R.R. 11411.5-116). Nlrs. Buttars died on July 1st, 1952 ( R.R. 11.5 ). .
.Melvin Buttars' testimony begins at page 118 of the
Record. His testimony begins with a recitation of dispositions of property made by his Father. Wallace, Archulius and Hattie were all minors at their father's death
( R.R. 122). Careful examination of this testimony fails
to disclose any mention of a fact touching on the matter
of undue influence or fraud. The only other witness was
a Mr. Nielsen, who is a real estate salesman and testified
only to land values. Respondents pleaded and relied on
the statute of limitations, and moved to dismiss because
of the running of the statute (R.R. 149 to 152).
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The above is the state of the Record so far as Appellants' testimony is concerned.
E:rma Thompson, (not a member of the Buttars family) visited Mrs. Buttars when the latter told her that she
was. going to make the contemplated conveyances. This
was ·in 1944 ( R.R. 154).
; :'; Clara Stewart (not a member of the Buttars family)
talked with Mrs. Buttars who told her that she had done
well. fpr the other children and "would like to make it up
for·:.the young~r children," meaning Wallace, Archulius
and Hattie ( R. 160-161). That was in 1944.
Tom Buttars ( R.R. 164) was a half brother of the father
of all the parties to this litigation, and in talking with Mrs.
Buhars mention was made that in the distribution of the
father's estate the minors had not gotten their just rights
and Mrs. Buttars then stated that she was· going to see to
~t that such would be the case ( R.R. 164. to 166). That
was between 1930 and 1940 and the reference was to
Wallace, Archulius and Hattie (R.R. 170).
David Sparks an impartial witness, stated ( R.R. 174
to 176) that Nlrs. Buttars told him betweenl938 and 1940
that:
"She said she felt like the three younger children,
Archulius, Wallace and Hattie, being the three
youngest, you know, didn't get a square deal when
their father's. estate was fixed up. And she said that
she had made up her mind that when the estate was
settled every one of the family got their share, and
they would go their way and do just as they pleased
with their portion of the property. And she felt
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like she had the same right to do with her property,
she was going to see that those younger children was
taken care of to her knowledge."
Wallace Buttars had never talked to his mother prior
to .her deposit of the money in the First National Bank
and he did not know of the deposit at the time ( R.R.l93).
There were statements in the safety box at the First Security Bank to the effect that certain transfers of stocks and
bonds were made for the purpose of equalizing the father's estate. Wallace had nothing to do with such statements ( R.R. 220) and he had nothing to do with the
account at the First National Bank, and had nothing to
do with transfering the money from First Security Bank to
the First National Bank, except on April 1st, 1950, he
signed the Joint Deposit ticket, (Ex. 16) with Emma G.
Buttars there creating a joint and several account. (R 152)
Upon that state of the record the lower Court held
that there was no fraud and no undue influence practiced
on Nirs. Emma G. Buttars.
ARGUMENT
Point 1. The findings and judgment of the Court,
finding and adjudging that Archulius Archibald and W allace Buttars, are the owners of the real property, mentioned and described in their respective cases, No. 7605
and No. 7607, are supported by competent and uncontradicted evidence.
The evidence is direct and positive that Emma G.
Buttars conveyed to the defendant Wallace Buttars 120
acres of dry farm land, as evidenced by two deeds of
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conveyance, identified as Ex. 23 and Ex. 24; and, she
conveyed to the defendant Archulius B. Archibald, 58.84
acres of land, as evidenced by two deeds of conveyance,
identified as Ex. 21 and Ex. 22. These deeds were executed by Mrs. Buttars on and between the 28th day of
March, 1945, and the 6th day of May 1948, and they were
filed for record with the County Recorder on the date
they bear, except Ex. 22, which was filed five days after
date thereof.
Mrs. Buttars reserved a life estate in the property
conveyed to Wallace and in the tract of 48.59 acres conveyed to Archulius.. Thus she continued to receive the
income from the property to and including the year 1952,
and her estate will receive the income to and including
1954, as provided by the written leases. And this income
is reflected in her bank accounts. ( R. 137). And moreover, Mrs. Buttars retained title to additional real property and also the bank accounts as appears from the
petition to probate her will. ( R. 1-4).
The manner in which Emma G. Buttars conducted
her business affairs was without suggestion from any individual. She selected the time when each of the aforesaid deeds were executed. The defendant Wallace Buttars testified from his business dealings and experience
with her that - "I know definitely that no one could get
Mother to do something she didn't want to do," and she
kept her business matters to herself. ( R. 368, 369).
With respect to the execution of said deeds, plaintiffs allege that the deeds were procured by unlawful
means and undue influence and with intent to defraud
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their brothers and sisters, and that Wallace and Archulius
persuaded their mothers, Emma G. Buttars, to execute and
deliver to them said deeds of conveyance. These allegations were denied by the defendants, and it is submitted
that plaintiffs evidence fails to prove these allegations. In
addition to the constructive notice given to the plaintiffs,
by the recording of said deeds, :Melvin, Maybell and Margaret had actual notice thereof at the meeting held at
Cornish Service Station in the fall of 1950. ( R.R. 94, 95,
102). Why didn't they then talk to their Mother about
the deeds and bank account, if they were in fact obtained
by fradulent means?
The fact that they did not then talk to her indicates
that they then knew their Mother had purposely executed
the deeds and opened the Savings account in the First
National Bank, in order to equalize for the property given
to the older children by their father. Although they did
not talk to their mother as a committee, it does appear
that 0:1aybell Griffith talked to her mother about the deeds
made to Wallace and Archulius, and in response, Mrs.
Buttars, according to the testimony of Archulius, "marked
off portions on the table and she said - "your father gave
the older boys their portions and I am going to give Wallace his." (R.R. 96).
The evidence discloses without dispute that Mrs.
Buttars intended to give the three younger children,
Archulius, Wallace and Hattie some property to equalize
the property given by their father to the older children,
particularly the older boys. ( R.R. 174). Testimony to
the same effect was given by the witness, David Sparks,
who testified that- "And she said that she had made up
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her mind that •when· the estate was settled every one of
the family got their.share, and· they would go their way
and'do just as they pleased with their portion of the property. And she felt like she had the same right to do with
her property, she ·was going to see that those younger
children was· taken care of to her knowledge" ( R.R, 174).
That conversation was had about the year 1945. ( R.R. 174)

It will thus be seen that Mrs. Buttars had been intending for a periOd of time to give the younger children
c~rtain property to equalize for the property received by
th~ older boys· when they were married. And moreover,
for. many years Archulius and Wallace lived near their
mother and saw her daily and when ever she needed a
service of ~ny kind ou'e or the other responded. This is
reflected throughout. their testimony.
It should also be kept in mind that this is not a case
.where the grantor conveyed all of his or her property, to
avoid heirs at law, or creditors. In the case at bar, Mrs.
Buttars. retained about 170 acres of farm land, and personal property, free of encumbrance, in which the plaintiffs herein will equally participate. In most, if not all
of the cases cited in appellants brief, the grantor's conveyance included all of his or her property.
'· Plaintiffs and appellants contend that Mrs. Buttars
~as· i~competent at th~ time each of the deeds were executed. The defendants witnesses testified that Md.
Buttars was fllcompetent at the ti~e each of the deeds
wer~ execute·cl""' 1 '* ~ 8th iky f mg, !E.fB.
In support- :of their .'COntention they cite, Kadogan v.
Booker~ 66 S. E. 297.
From an examination of the
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opinion in that case it will ·be seen that the mental
and physical condition of Laura Swain, the grantor,· at
the time she executed the deed was vastly different from
the mental and physical condition of Mrs. Buttars, when
each of the deeds in question were executed by her. And
the circumstances under which the deed was executed
in that case were entirely different from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of deeds in the
case at bar. Despite that fact the Supreme Court of West
Virginia stated the rule to be - "There exists a presumption that a grantor in a deed conveying real estate was
mentally competent to execute the deed. Mere infirmity
of mind and body is not sufficient to over come such presumption. The time of the execution and delivery of the
instrument is the time at which the question of mental
capacity is to be determined."
Appellants cite Johnson vs. Reese, 249 S. W. 538,
(Ky.) as authority. Here again the facts and circumstances are at variance with the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the deeds by Mrs. Buttars.
In the course of the opinion the court stated: ''There was
evidence that grantor was easily influenced," and that,
"The daughter and her husband, living with the grantor,
had the opportunity to and undoubtedly did influence
him. The record shows that the grantor was in bad health
and had to be taken care of before and at the !time of the
execution of the deed."
The case of :Morris vs. Williams-Gfuriso~, 128 S. E.
78, 99 W. Va. 140, is also cited by appellants. In reviewing the facts the court stated: "The grantor in that case
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was a moron. From his childhood his mentality had been
regarded subnormal by his family, and the people of the
community. His mind had never grown up. His parents
considered him mentally incapable of. attending to any
business, and managed all his affairs during their life.time."
, .We have examined all the cases cited by appellants
in their brief and in every instance -the condition of the
grantor was in a much more serious condition than was
Emma C. Buttars when she executed each of the deeds
involved in the case at bar. In fact her h~alth was normal
for a woman of her age. This is the testimony of some
15 witnes_ses including neighbors, business people and her
physician, all of whom testified positively that until March
21, 1951, when she suffered a heart attack, she was healthy
and normal in all respects. She took care of her own business, wrote and signed checks on her bank account. Made
deposits to her checking and savings accounts, and it was
during this time that she purchased the bonds and securities found in her bank box after her demise. n As reflected
by the evidence in this case Mrs .. Buttars' business ability
and acumen was far above average.
Point 2. Appellants contend that there existed a
confidential relationship between Emma G. Buttars and
her children, Archulius and Wallace, at the time the
transfers or attempted transfers were made.
Appelants base their conclusions upon the fact that
Archulius and Wallace lived near their mother and visited
frequently. Appellants counsel cite the case of Fisher vs.
Burgiel, (Ill.) 46 N. E. 380, contending that the facts in
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that case are similar to the facts in the instant case. When
the opinion in that case is examined it will be seen that
the mental and physical condition of Nellie Hollingshead
were such that she was suffering from senile dementia;
that she did not understand or comprehend the nature of
her acts. She was forgetful and absent minded, was dirty
and unkempt in her house and personal habits; that she
failed to recognize old friends. Her physjcian testified
that from 1936, she had a progressive senile dementia.
It was while in this condition that she signed the deeds
and made withdrawals from the Bank. The foregoing
facts appears from the opinion. There was some testimony to the contrary. There was no reservation of a life
estate, and it does not appear whether she possessed or
owned other property, but it is evident from the condition
of her health that she was unable to and did not transact
business as was done by Mrs. Buttars, for more than three
years after the last deed was executed.
The case of Woolwine vs. Bryant, (Iowa) 54 N. W.
759, is cited but the facts in that case are dissimilar from
the facts in case at bar. No relationship existed between
the grantor and grantee, and a life estate in the property
was not reserved in the deed. On conflicting evidence
the court cancelled the deed and upon appeal judgment
was affirmed. In the case at bar there was substantial
evidence to support the judgment of the trial court, and
although the plaintiffs attempted to show that there existed a confidential relationship between Mrs. Buttars and
Wallace and Archulius, there was an abundance of testimony to the contrary, and the court had a right to resolve
the conflict, if any, in favor of respondents.
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By use of the Corpus Juris digest we were referred
to a very late Oklahoma case, Watkins vs. Musselman et.
al. 239 P. 2nd 418, where the facts are very similar to the
facts in the instant case, and it was contended that fraud
and undue influence had been exercised upon the grantor.
The· trial court there held that the deeds were executed
and delivered as the free and voluntary act of the grantor,
and that the transaction was free of any undue influence
or fraud: In- the course of the opinion the court held that
_:_"the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on
appeal, unless the same is clearly against the weight of the
evidence.'? In holding against the contention of the plaintiff and appellant in that case, that undue influence had
been execised upon .the grantor when she executed the
deed the court stated: "As we view the plaintiffs' evidence
it, at most, discloses that Patti Musselman had an opportunity to unduly influence Mrs. Brown, not that she in
fact did.'' In the course of the opinion the following rule
is stated: "Power, motive and opportunity to exercise undue influence do not alone authorize the inference that
such influence has in fact been exercised," and, in referring to the court's holding in a previous case, Melton vs.
Melton, 135 P. 2d. 43, the opinion states: "we held: 'To
set aside any transaction on the ground of undue influence,
it must be shown not only that such influence existed and
that it was exercised, but also that it was exercised effectively; that is, that it was the efficient cause in bringing
about the transaction complained of.''
We also found a late case from the state of Colorado.
Mehlbrant vs. Hal, 213 P. 2d. 605. The facts in that case
reveal that in accordance with a previous wish the mother

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

executed a deed conveying certain real estate to her son.
It appears that this was the only property she owned.
Her daughter with whom she had lived shortly prior to
the execution of this deed, and apparently the only other
child took action as the administratix of her estate to set
aside the deed. The trial court held against the plaintiff
and on appeal the judgment was affirmed.
Upon appeal the appellant contended that there was
a fiduciary relationship between mother and son and that
the son had exercised undue influence upon his mother
in procuring the deed. The trial court in finding against
the plaintiff stated: "The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and after most mature consideration of all the facts,
I must conclude that the plaintiff has not sustained the
burden, and the issues in this case will be resolved in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs complaint will be dismissed."
In the course of the opinion the court followed a rule
adopted by the court in an earlier case: "In equity the
judgment is essentially a deduction as to what is just and
true from the facts and circumstances proven in each particular case. It is therefore a question for the trial court
as to the convincing effect of the evidence, when that
tribunal enters a decree, and there is a quantum of admissible and proper evidence to support its conclusions, we
must presume that it was governed by proper rules of
law, unless the contrary appears, and that its findings are
correct."
There are numerous decisions holding to the same
effect. When that rule is applied to the undisputed facts
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in the case at bar, it is respectfully submitted that the
judgments of the trial court should be affirmed.
Point 3. The findings and fudgment of the court
declaring Wallace Buttars and Archilus B. Archibald to
be owners of the United States savings bond, mentioned
and described in their respective cases, are supported
by competent and uncontradicted evidence.
The United States Savings Bonds involved in this
matter were held in joint tenants and the parties so stipulated ( R.R. 149). The Court asked the question ( R.R.
149): "Q. Do I understand that either of these owners
could present that bond for payment, and be paid in cash
without the other persons consent or authorization in any
way? A. That is right." (R.R. 149). This, of course,
should dispose of the question of ownership of the bonds.
Davies v. Beach et al (Cal.) 168 2d 452. (Note:
This case involved U. S. Bonds with the standard
"payable at death" clause, but the Court did not
consider the difference between such a clause and
joint tenancy important) "the regulations of the
Treasury Department, under which the bonds are
issued, have the force of Federal Laws; the State
cannot vary the terms of federal obligations . . . . .
Some of the bonds in those· cases were issued to two
persons as co-owners, and others to the purchaser,
and upon his death, to a named beneficiary. There
seems to be no logical distinction to be made between
the rights in the bonds of a surviving beneficiary."
We believe that a recent Montana case sufficiently
disposes of this particular question. In Re Marsh's Estate
(Mont.) 234 P. 2d 459. In that case the bonds were made
in the name of "C. H. Marsh," and others.
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"However, government bonds (same type as involved
in our case) because of the special nature of the
contract can never be held in tenancy by the entirety. The characteristic that disinguishes the tenancy by the entirety from other co-tenancies is that
neither of the cotenants alone can terminate the
tenancy or sever the estate. Either cotenant may
sell government bonds upon sun-ender of the bond
and receive the full accrued value. The tenancy is
thus severed and one cotenant can reduce the entire
property to his own possession and his cotenant receives nothing." (Italics supplied.)
The law relating to gifts inter vivos has no application to U.S. Treasury Bonds, and this has been held countless times. For an example see Lee v. Anderson (Ariz.)
218 P. 2d 732. Further citations would unduly lengthen
this brief to no avail.
Point 4. The findings and fudgment of the court,
finding and ad fudging that Wallace Buttars is the owner
of the savings account in the First National Bank, are supported by competent and uncontradicted evidence.
From the evidence it appears that Emma G. Buttars,
on January 29, 1947, deposited $5,000.00, with the First
National Bank of Logan, in a joint savings account in the
names of Emma G. Buttars, Oid! Wallace Buttars. ( R.R.
147). The deposit ticket was identified as Con. No. 11,
Case No. 5167, and was offered and received in evidence.
With permission of the court a copy of this exhibit was
substituted for the original. ( R.R. 149). On that date
the account was posted to the Savings account ledger
sheet. ( R.R. 147). And a joint deposit card (Con. Ex.
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No. 13) was prepared with the names of Emma G. Buttars
and Walace Buttars, typed thereon under date of Jan. 29,
1947. This card contained the signatures of Emma G.
Buttars and Walace Buttars on the front side thereof, but
apparently through oversight they did not sign their
names to the reverse side thereof. ( R.R. 152). This card
was identified as exhibit No. 13.
The account remained in this condition until April 24,
1950, when a new card (Ex. No. 16) was prepared by the
bank and presented to Emma G. Buttars, when she and
Walace signed it on both sides and in accordance therewith a joint account was legaly established. This card
remained in possession of the bank until it was offered in
evidence in the trial of the case No. 5167, and with permission of the court it was released to the bank and a copy
thereof was substituted. ( R.R. 153).
On J an~ary 6~ 1948, Mr. Hanson, wrote a letter to
Mrs. Buttars, to inquire whether she intended that the
account should be a joint account with her son Wallace.
"We are now concerned about what your wishes actually
were. Is this account supposed to be a joint account with
yourself. and your son, and if so does your name and his
name appear on your savings pass book." (Con. Ex. No.
19, Case No. 5167).
Mrs. Buttars replied to the aforesaid letter on Jan.
10, 1948, in which letter she stated: "In reply to your
letter of Jan. 6, 1948. I wish to inform you that this account you mention should be a joint account with me and
my son Wallace, and that his name does appear on the
savings pass book. · Thank you, very truly, EMMA G.
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BUTTARS." The letter was likely written by the bank,
because some of the plaintiffs called there to investigate
the account. ( R.R. 155) and Mr. Hanson wanted definite
information directly from Mrs. Buttars, relative to the
nature of the account. And from the language of her
reply he received direct information from her that it was
a joint account.
Subsequently thereto the bank discovered that the
joint deposit card, Exhibit 13, did not contain the signahires of Emma G. Buttars and Wallace Buttars on the
reverse side thereof below the JOINT DEPOSITORS
AGREEMENT. Accordingly the bank prepared what is
identified as Con. No. 16, Date April 24, 1950, and presented it to Mrs. Buttars and she and Wallace signed it
on both sides and it is retained by the bank to evidence
the joint ownership of the savings account.
The appellants have not cited any legal authority
with respect to the bank account. They merely contend
that she was unduly influenced by Wallace. The undisputed evidence shows that he was not aware of the savings account until after it had been made. ( R. 194). The
appellants admit in their brief, page 46, that :Maybell
learned of the savings account after it was made. And
Russell Hanson testified that plaintiff Melvin Buttars and
his brother Orson came to the bank in the year 1950, to
investigate the Savings account, rand that some of the girls
came to the bank to talk to Mr. Hanson about the account.
(R. 155). If in fact Wallace had unduly influenced his
mother in giving him savings account, which is not admitted, why did not the boys and girls above referred to
inform :\1rs. Buttars that she had been defrauded? She
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was alive and could have taken legal action against Wallace, if in fact he had taken undue advantage of her. And
if she had been as weak minded as there testimony implies,
a guardian could have been appointed to bring proper
legal action against Wallace. But on the contrary not a
thing is done until after her demise.
Mr. John Olson, assistant cashier of the First National
Bank testified that Contestant's exhibit No. 16, created a
joint account between Emma G. Buttars and Wallace
Buttars, and that upon the death of either party, the survivor became the owner of the account. ( R.R. 182).
The appellants contended that because the passbook
.to the ac~ount coud not be found, it affected the legality
of the joint account. However, Ariel Berntson, assistant
cashier of the Bank testified that the ownership of the
savings account in question was evidenced by the joint
depositors's agreement on the reverse side of exhibit No.
16, dated April 24, 1950, and not upon the passbook.
( R.R. 226). He also testified that if the passbook is lost,
"we have them sign an indemnity bond protecting the
bank.'' The ownership of the account is not affected by
loss of the pass book. ( R.R.227).
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of this
Court in the case of Holt vs. Bayles, 39 P. 2d 716, is controlling and determinative in the case at bar. By comparison it will be seen that the deposit card signed by
Anna M. Bayles and Emma Bayles, when the savings
account was made is identical in substance with the card
signed by Mrs. Buttars and Wallace, dated April24, 1950.
(Ex. No. 16). In the course of the opinion it is stated:
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"The trial court in its decision was controlled largely by
the agreement of joint tenancy executed by Anna and
Emma Bayles. The effect to be given the writing is indeed the crux of the case."
This court also distinguishes three former decisions:
"The cases of Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, Olson
v. Scott, and Boyle v. Dinsdale, supra, turned on the
question of whether or not there was a gift inter
vivos, not whether there had been the creation of
a joint ownership with right of Survivorship."
In view of the express provisions contained in the
depositors signature card in that case, as is true in the
case at bar, it was held that the account shall be owned
by them jointly with right of survivorship.
For the foreging reason defendants and respondents
respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court in
both cases should be affirmed with costs.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. NELSON
GEORGE D. PRESTON,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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